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Abstract. Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a key technology 
for next generation wireless broadband networks showing rapid progress and 
inspiring numerous compelling applications. A WMN comprises of a set of 
mesh routers (MRs) and mesh clients (MCs), where MRs are connected to the 
Internet backbone through the Internet gateways (IGWs). The MCs are wireless 
devices and communicate among themselves over possibly multi-hop paths 
with or without the involvement of MRs. User privacy and security have been 
primary concerns in WMNs due to their peer-to-peer network topology, shared 
wireless medium, stringent resource constraints, and highly dynamic environ-
ment. Moreover, to support real-time applications, WMNs must also be 
equipped with robust, reliable and efficient communication protocols so as to 
minimize the end–to-end latency and packet drops. Design of a secure and effi-
cient communication protocol for WMNs, therefore, is of paramount impor-
tance. In this paper, we propose a security and privacy protocol that provides 
security and user anonymity while maintaining communication efficiency in a 
WMN.  The security protocol ensures secure authentication and encryption in 
access and the backbone networks. The user anonymity, authentication and data 
privacy is achieved by application of a protocol that is based on Rivest’s ring 
signature scheme. Simulation results demonstrate that while the protocols have 
minimal storage and communication overhead, they are robust and provide high 
level of security and privacy to the users of the network services.   
Keywords: Wireless mesh network (WMN), user anonymity, security, authen-
tication, key management, Rivest ring signature scheme, privacy.  
1   Introduction 
Wireless mesh networking has emerged as a promising concept to meet the challenges 
in next-generation wireless networks such as providing flexible, adaptive, and reconfi-
gurable architecture while offering cost-effective solutions to service providers. 
WMNs are multi-hop wireless networks formed by mesh routers (which form a wire-
less mesh backbone) and mesh clients. The mesh routers provide a rich radio mesh 
connectivity which significantly reduces the up-front deployment cost of the network. 
Mesh routers are typically stationary and do not have power constraints. However, the 
clients are mobile and energy-constrained. Some mesh routers are designated as gate-
way routers which are connected to the Internet through a wired backbone. A gateway 
router provides access to conventional clients and interconnects ad hoc, sensor, cellu-
lar, and other networks to the Internet. A mesh network can provide multi-hop com-
munication paths between wireless clients, thereby serving as a community network, 
or can provide multi-hop paths between the client and the gateway router, thereby 
providing broadband Internet access to the clients.  
As WMNs become an increasingly popular replacement technology for last-mile 
connectivity to the home networking, community and neighborhood networking, it is 
imperative to design an efficient resource management protocols for these networks. 
However, several vulnerabilities currently exist in various protocols for WMNs. These 
vulnerabilities can be exploited by the attackers to degrade the performance of a net-
work. The absence of a central point of administration makes the WMN protocols 
vulnerable to various types of attacks. Security is therefore an issue which is of prime 
importance in WMNs [1]. Since in a WMN, traffic of an end user is relayed via mul-
tiple wireless mesh routers, preserving privacy of the user data is also a critical re-
quirement [2]. Majority of the current security and privacy protocols for WMNs are 
extensions of protocols originally designed for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) 
and therefore their performances are suboptimal.    
Keeping this problem in mind, this paper presents a novel security protocol for 
node authentication and message confidentiality for WMNs. In addition it also 
presents a user anonymization scheme that ensures secure authentication of the mesh 
clients (i.e., the user devices) while protecting their privacy. 
The key contributions of the paper are as follows:  (i) It proposes a novel security 
protocol for the mesh client nodes and the mesh routers. (ii) For protecting user priva-
cy while providing a secure authentication framework for the mesh clients (user de-
vices), it presents a novel anonymization scheme that utilizes the essential idea of 
Rivest group signature scheme [3].    
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work on 
routing in WMNs. Section 3 presents the details of the architecture of a WMN and the 
assumptions made for the development of the proposed protocols. Section 4 and Sec-
tion 5 describe the proposed security and the privacy protocols respectively. Section 6 
presents some performance results of the proposed scheme, and Section 7 highlights 
some future scope of work and concludes the paper.    
2   Related Work 
Since security and privacy are two extremely important issues in any communication 
network, researchers have worked on these two areas extensively. However, as coma-
pred to MANETs and wireless sensor networks (WSNs), WMNs have received very 
little attention in this regard. . This section briefly discusses some of the existing me-
chanisms for ensuring security and privacy in communications in WMNs.  
In [4], a standard mechanism has been proposed for client authentication and 
access control to guarantee a high-level of flexibility and transparency to all users in a 
wireless network. The users can access the mesh network without requiring any 
change in their devices and softwares. However, client mobility can pose severe prob-
lems to the security architecture, especially when real-time traffic is transmitted. To 
cope with this problem, proactive key distribution has been proposed [5, 6]. 
Providing security in the backbone network for WMNs is another important chal-
lenge. Mesh networks typically employ resource constrained mobile clients, which are 
difficult to protect against removal, tampering, or replication. If the device can be 
remotely managed, a distant hacking into the device would work perfectly [7]. Accor-
dingly, several research works have been done to investigate the use of cryptographic 
techniques to achieve secure communication in WMNs.  In [8], a security architecture 
has been proposed that is suitable for multi-hop WMNs employing PANA (Protocol 
for carrying Authentication for Network Access) [9]. In the scheme, the wireless 
clients are authenticated on production of the cryptographic credentials necessary to 
create an encrypted tunnel with the remote access router to which they are associated. 
Even though such framework protects the confidentiality of the information ex-
changed, it cannot prevent adversaries to perform active attacks against the network 
itself. For instance, a malicious adversary can replicate, modify and forge the topology 
information exchanged among mesh devices, in order to launch a denial of service 
attack.  Moreover, PANA necessitates the existence of IP addresses in all the mesh 
nodes, which is poses a serious constraint on deployment of this protocol. 
Authenticating transmitted data packets is an approach for preventing unauthorized 
nodes to access the resources of a WMN. A light-weight hop-by-hop access protocol 
(LHAP) has been proposed for authenticating mobile clients in wireless dynamic envi-
ronments, preventing resource consumption attacks [10]. LHAP implements light-
weight hop-by-hop authentication, where intermediate nodes authenticate all the pack-
ets they receive before forwarding them. LHAP employs a packet authentication tech-
nique based on the use of one-way hash chains. Moreover, LHAP uses TESLA [11] 
protocol to reduce the number of public key operations for bootstrapping and main-
taining trust between nodes.  
In [12], a lightweight authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) infra-
structure is proposed for providing continuous, on-demand, end-to-end security in 
heterogeneous networks including WMNs. The notion of a security manager is used 
through employing an AAA broker. The broker acts as a settlement agent, providing 
security and a central point of contact for many service providers.  
The issue of user privacy in WMNs has also attracted the attention of the research 
community. In [2], a light-weight privacy preserving solution is presented to achieve 
well-maintained balance between network performance and traffic privacy preserva-
tions. At the center of the solution is of information-theoretic metric called traffic 
entropy, which quantifies the amount of information required to describe the traffic 
pattern and to characterize the performance of traffic privacy preservation. The au-
thors have also presented a penalty-based shortest path routing algorithm that max-
imally preserves traffic privacy by minimizing the mutual information of traffic entro-
py observed at each individual relaying node, meanwhile controlling performance 
degradation within the acceptable region. Extensive simulation study proves the 
soundness of the solution and its resilience to cases when two malicious observers 
collude. However, one of the major problems of the solution is that the algorithm is 
evaluated in a single-radio, single channel WMN. Performance of the algorithm in 
multiple radios, multiple channels  scenario will be a really questionable issue. More-
over, the solution has a scalability problem.  
In [13], a mechanism is proposed with the objective of hiding an active node that 
connects to a gateway router, where the active mesh node has to be anonymous. A 
novel communication protocol is designed to protect the node’s privacy using both 
cryptography and redundancy. This protocol uses the concept of onion routing [14]. A 
mobile user who requires anonymous communication sends a request to an onion 
router (OR). The OR acts as a proxy to the mobile user and constructs a onion route 
consisting of other ORs using the public keys of the routers. The onion is constructed 
such that the inner most part is the message for the intended destination, and the mes-
sage is wrapped by being encrypted using the public keys of the ORs in the route. The 
mechanism protects the routing information from insider and outsider attack. Howev-
er, it has a high computation and communication overhead. 
None of the above propositions, however, addresses all the security problems of a 
typical WMN. Most of the schemes handle security issues at a specific layer, and 
therefore, fail to provide a multi-layer attack on the protocol stack of a WMN. This 
paper proposes a security and privacy framework that addresses issues both at the 
access and the backbone networks while not affecting the network performance.  
3   WMN Security Architecture   
In this section, we first present a standard architecture of a typical WMNS for which 
we propose a security and privacy protocol. The architecture is a very generic one that 
represents majority of the real-world deployment scenarios for WMNs. The architec-
ture of a hierarchical WMN consists of three layers as shown in Fig. 1. At the top 
layers are the Internet gateways (IGWs) that are connected to the wired Internet. They 
form the backbone infrastructure for providing Internet connectivity to the elements in 
the second level. The entities at the second level are called wireless mesh routers 
(MRs) that eliminate the need for wired infrastructure at every MR and forward their 
traffic in a multi-hop fashion towards the IGW. At the lowest level are the mesh 
clients (MCs) which are the wireless devices of the users. Internet connectivity and 
peer-to-peer communications inside the mesh are two important applications for a 
WMN. Therefore design of an efficient and low-overhead communication protocol 
which ensure security and privacy of the users is a critical requirement which poses 
significant research challenges. For design of the proposed protocol and to specify the 
WMN scenario, the following assumptions are made.  
(1) Each MR which is authorized to join the wireless backbone (through the 
IGWs), has two certificates to prove its identity. One certificate is used during 
the authentication phase that occurs when a new node joins the network. EAP-
TLS [15] for 802.1X authentication is used for this purpose since it is the 
strongest authentication method provided by EAP [15], whereas the second 
certificate is used for the authentication with the authentication server (AS). 
(2) The certificates used for authentication with the RADIUS server and the AS 
are signed by the same certificate authority (CA). Only recognized MRs are 
authorized to join the backbone.   
(3)  Synchronization of all MRs is achieved by use of the network time protocol 
(NTP) protocol [16].  
 Fig. 1. The three-tier architecture of a wireless mesh network (WMN) 
The proposed security protocol serves the dual purpose of providing security in the 
access network (i.e., between the MCs and the MRs) and the backbone network (i.e., 
between the MRs and the IGWs). These are described the following sub-sections. 
3.1   Access Network Security    
The access mechanism to the WMN is assumed to be the same as that of a local area 
network (LAN), where mobile devices authenticate themselves and connect to an 
access point (AP). This allows the users to the access the services of the WMN ex-
ploiting the authentication and authorization mechanisms without installing any addi-
tional software. It is evident that such security solution provides protection to the 
wireless links between the MCs and the MRs. A separate security infrastructure is 
needed for the links in the backbone networks. This is discussed in Section 3.2.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Secure information exchange among the MCs A and B through the MRs 1 and 2  
Fig. 2 illustrates a scenario where users A and B are communicating in a secure way 
to MRs 1 and 2 respectively. If the wireless links are not protected, an intruder M will 
be able to eavesdrop on and possibly manipulate the information being exchanged 
over the network. This situation is prevented in the proposed security scheme which 
encrypts all the traffic transmitted on the wireless link using a stream cipher in the data 
link layer of the protocol stack. 
3.2   Backbone Network Security       
For providing security for the traffic in the backbone network, a two-step approach is 
adopted. When a new MR joins the network, it first presents itself as an MC and com-
pletes the association formalities. It subsequently upgrades its association by suc-
cesssfully authenticating to the AS. In order to make such authentication process effi-
cient in a high mobility scenario, the key management and distribution processes have 
been designed in a way so as to minimize the effect of the authentication overhead on 
the network performance. The overview of the protocol is discussed as follows.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Steps performed by a new MR (N) using backbone encrypted traffic to join the WMN   
Fig. 3 shows the three phases of the authentication process that a MR (say N) un-
dergoes. When N wants to join the network, it scans all the radio channels to detect 
any MR that is already connected to the wireless backbone. Once such an MR (say A) 
is detected, N requests A for access to network services including authentication and 
key distribution. After connecting to A, N can perform the tasks prescribed in the 
IEEE 802.11i protocol to complete a mutual authentication with the network and es-
tablish a security association with the entity to which it is physically connected. This 
completes the Phase I of the authentication process. Essentially, during this phase, a 
new MR performs all the steps that an MC has to perform to establish a secure chan-
nel with an MR for authentication and secure communication over the WMN.  
During Phase II of the authentication process, the MRs use the TLS protocol. Only 
authorized MRs that have the requisite credentials can authenticate to the AS and 
obtain the cryptographic credentials needed to derive the key sequence used to protect 
the wireless backbone. In the proposed protocol, an end-to-end secure channel be-
tween the AS and the MR is established at the end of a successful authentication 
through which the cryptographic credentials can be exchanged in a secure way. 
To eliminate any possibility of the same key being used over a long time, two pro-
tocols are proposed for secure key management. These protocols are presented in 
Section 4. As mentioned earlier in this section, all the MRs are assumed to be syn-
chronized with a central server using the NTP protocol.   
 
 Fig. 4. Autonomous configuration of the MRs in the proposed security scheme  
Fig. 4 shows a collection of four MRs connected with each other by five wireless 
links. The MR A is connected with the AS by a wired link. At the time of network 
bootstrapping, only node A can connect to the network as an MR, since it is the only 
node that can successfully authenticate to the AS. Nodes B and C which are neighbors 
of A then detect a wireless network to which can connect and perform the authentica-
tion process following the IEEE 802.11i protocol. At this point of time, nodes B and C 
are successfully authenticated as MCs. After their authentication as MCs, nodes B and 
C are allowed to authenticate to the AS and request the information used by A to pro-
duce the currently used cryptographic key for communication in the network. After 
having derived such key, both B and C will be able to communicate with each other, 
as well as with node A, using the ad hoc mode of communication in the WMN. At this 
stage, B and C both have full MR functionalities. They will be able to turn on their 
access interface for providing node D a connection to the AS for joining the network.   
4   The Key Distribution Protocol   
In this section, the details of the proposed key distribution and management protocol 
are presented. The protocol is essentially a server-initiated protocol [17] and provides 
the clients (MRs and MCs) flexibility and autonomy during the key generation.  
4.1   Server Initiated Key Management Protocol   
In the proposed key management protocol delivers the keys to all the MRs from the 
AS in a reactive manner. The keys are used subsequently by the MRs for a specific 
time interval in their message communications to ensure integrity and confidentiality 
of the messages. After the expiry of the time interval for validity of the keys, the exist-
ing keys are revoked and new keys are generated by the AS. Fig. 5 depicts the mes-
sage exchanges between the MRs and the AS during the execution of the protocol. 
A newly joined MR, after its successful mutual authentication with a central server, 
sends its first request for key list (and its time of generation) currently being used by 
other existing MRs in the wireless backbone. Let us denote the key list timestamp as 
TSKL.  Let us define a session as the maximum time interval for validity of the key list 
currently being used by each node MR and MC). We also define the duration of a 
session as the product of the cardinality of the key list (i.e., the number of the keys in 
the key list) and the longest time interval of validity of a key (the parameter timeout in 
Fig. 5). The validity of a key list is computed from the time instance when the list is 
generated (i.e., TSKL) by the AS. An MR, based on the time instance at which it joins 
the backbone (tnow in Fig. 5), can find out the key (from the current list) being used by 
its peers (keyidx) and the interval of validity of the key (Ti) using (1) and (2) as follows: 
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In the proposed protocol, each WMN node requests the AS for the key list that will 
be used in the next session before the expiry of the current session. This is feature is 
essential for nodes which are located multiple hops away from the AS, since, res-
ponses from the AS take longer time to reach these nodes. The responses may also get 
delayed due to fading or congestion in the wireless links. If the nodes send their re-
quests for key list to the AS just before expiry of the current session, then due to li-
mited time in hand, only the nodes which have good quality links with the AS will 
receive the key list. Hence, the nodes which will fail to receive responses for the serv-
er will not be able to communicate in the next session due to non-availability of the 
current key list. This will lead to an undesirable situation of network partitioning.   
 
 
Fig. 5. The message exchanges between an MR and the AS in the key management protocol.   
The key index value that triggers the request from the nodes to the server can be set 
equal to the difference between the cardinality of the list and a correction factor. The 
correction factor can be estimated based on parameters like the network load, the 
distance of the node from the AS and the time required for the previous response.  
In the proposed protocol, the correction factor is estimated based on the time to re-
ceive the response from the AS using (3), where ts is the time instance when the first 
key request was sent, tr is the time instance when the key response was received from 
the AS, and timeout is the validity period of the key.  Therefore, if a node fails to 
receive a response (i.e., the key list) from the AS during timeout, and takes a time tlast, 
it must send the next request to the AS before setting the last key.  
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The first request of the key list sent by the new node to the AS is forwarded by the 
peer to which it is connected as an MC through the wireless access network. However, 
the subsequent requests are sent directly over the wireless backbone.      
5   The Privacy and Anonymity Protocol   
As mentioned in Section 1, to ensure privacy of the users, the proposed security pro-
tocol is complemented with a privacy protocol so as to ensure user anonymity and 
privacy. The same authentication server (AS) used in the security protocol is used for 
managing the key distribution for preserving the privacy. To enable user authentica-
tion and anonymity, a novel protocol has been designed extending the ring signature 
authentication scheme in [18]. It is assumed that a symmetric encryption algorithm E 
exists such that for any key k, the function Ek is a permutation over b-bit strings. We 
also assume the existence of a family of keyed combining functions Ck,v(y1, y2, …., yn), 
and a publicly defined collision-resistant hash function H(.) that maps arbitrary inputs 
to strings of constant length which are used as keys for Ck,v(y1, y2, …., yn) [3]. Every 
keyed combining function Ck,v(y1, y2, …., yn) takes as input the key k, an initialization 
b-bit value v, and arbitrary values y1, y2, …., yn. A user Ui who wants to generate a 
session key with the authentication server, uses a ring of n logged-on-users and per-
forms the following steps. 
Step 1: Ui chooses the following parameters: (i) a large prime pi such that it is hard 
to compute discrete logarithms in GF(pi), (ii) another large prime qi such that qi | pi – 
1, and (iii) a generator gi in GF(pi) with order qi. 
Step 2: Ui chooses 
ii qA
Zx ∈  as his private key, and computes the public 
key i
x
iA pgy Aii mod= . 
Step 3: Ui defines a trap-door function ii
q
Aii pgyf i mod..),( mod βααβα = . Its in-
verse function )(1 yf i−  is defined as ),()(1 βα=− yf i , where α  and β  are com-
puted as follows (K is a random integer in qiZ . 
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Ui makes pi, qi, gi and iAy  public, and keeps iAx  as secret. 
The authentication server (AS) chooses: (i) a large prime p such that it is hard to 
compute discrete logarithms in GF(p), (ii) another large prime q such that q | p – 1, 
(iii) a generator g in GF(p) with order q, (iv) a random integer xB from Zq as its private 
key. AS computes its public key pgy BxB mod=   and publishes (yB, p, q, g).  
Anonymous authenticated key exchange: The key-exchange is initiated by the us-
er Ui and involves three rounds to compute a secret session key between Ui and AS. 
The operations in these three rounds are as follows: 
Round 1: When Ui wants to generate a session key on the behalf of n ring users U1, 
U2, …..Un, where ni ≤≤1 , Ui does the following: 
(i) Ui chooses two random integers x1, xA ∈  *qZ  and computes the following: 
pgR x mod1= , qpyQ xB modmod1= , pgX ax mod=  and ),,,,( IyVQXHl B= . 
(ii) Ui Chooses a pair of values ),( tt βα for every other ring member Ut 
),1( ktnt ≠≤≤ in a pseudorandom way, and computes ttttt pfy mod),( βα= . 
(iii) Ui randomly chooses a b-bit initialization value v, and finds the value of iy  
from the equation vyyyC nvk =)( ,........2,1, . 
(iv) Ui computes )(),( 1 iiii yf −=βα  by using the trap-door information of if . 
First, it chooses a random integer
iq
ZK ∈ , computes iα  using (6), and keeps K secret. 
It then computes *iα  using (5) and finally computes iβ  using (6).  
(v) ),(),.,,(),,(,,,.,,( 2211,21 nnn RVvUUU βαβαβα  is the ring signature σ  on X. 
Finally, Ui sends σ  and I  to the server AS. 
Round 2: AS does the following to recover and verify X from the signatureσ . 
(i) AS computes qpRQ Bx modmod= , recovers X using pgVX Q mod.=  and hash-
es X, Q, V and yb to recover l, where ),,,,( IyVQXHl B= . 
(ii) AS  computes ittit pfy mod),( βα= , for t = 1,2,…..n. 
(iii) AS checks whether 
.).........(
,2,1, vyyyC nvk =  If it is true, AS accepts X as valid; 
otherwise, AS rejects X. If X is valid, AS chooses a random integer xb from *qZ , and 
computes the following: pgY bx mod=  pXK bxs mod=  and ),,,( 'IYXKHh s= . AS 
sends {h, Y, 'I } to Ui.  
Round 3: Ui verifies whether 'SK  is from the server AS. For this purpose, Ui com-
putes pYK axS mod
'
= , hashes K, X, Y to get 'h  using ),,,( ''' IYXKHh s= . If 
hh =?' , Ui accepts Ks as the session key. 
Security analysis: The key exchange scheme satisfies the following requirements. 
User anonymity: For a given signature X, the server can only be convinced that the 
ring signature is actually produced by at least one of the possible users. If the actual 
user does not reveal the seed K, the server cannot determine the identity of the user. 
The strength of the anonymity depends on the security of the pseudorandom number 
generator.  It is not possible to determine the identity of the actual user in a ring of 
size n with a probability greater than 1/n. Since the values of k and v are fixed in a 
ring signature, there are 1)2( −nb  number of ),...,( 21 nxxx  that satisfy the equation 
vyyyC nvk =),...,( 21, , and the probability of generation of each ),...,( 21 nxxx is the same. 
Therefore, the signature can’t leak the identity information of the user. 
Mutual authentication: In the proposed scheme, not only the server verifies the us-
ers, but the users can also verify the server. Because of the hardness of inverting the 
hash function f(.), it is computationally infeasible for the attacker to determine ),( ii βα , 
and hence it is infeasible for him to forge a signature. If the attacker wants to masque-
rade as the AS, he needs to compute ),,( YXKHh s= . He requires xB in order to com-
pute X. However, xB is the private key of AS to which the attacker has no access.   
Forward secrecy: The forward secrecy of a scheme refers to its ability to defend 
leaking of its keys of previous sessions when an attacker is able to catch hold of the 
key of a particular session. The forward secrecy of a scheme enables it to prevent 
replay attacks. In the proposed scheme, since xa and xb are both selected randomly, 
the session key of each period has not relation to the other periods. Therefore, if the 
session key generated in the period j is leaked, the attacker can not get any informa-
tion of the session keys generated before the period j. The proposed protocol is, there-
fore, resistant to replay attack.   
6   Performance Evaluation 
The proposed security and privacy protocols have been implemented in the Qualnet 
network simulator, version 4.5 [19]. The simulated network consists of 50 nodes ran-
domly distributed in the simulation area forming a dense WMN. The WMN topology 
is shown in Fig. 6, in which 5 are MRs and remaining 45 are MCs. Each MR has 9 
MCs associated with it. To evaluate the performance of the security protocol, first the 
network is set as a full-mesh topology, where each MR (and also MC) is directly con-
nected to two of its neighbors. In such as scenario, the throughput of a TCP connec-
tion established over a wireless link is measured with the security protocol activated in 
the nodes. The obtained results are then compared with the throughput obtained on the 
same wireless link protected by a static key to encrypt the traffic.  
After having 10 simulation runs, the average throughput of a wireless link between 
a pair of MRs was found to be equal to 30.6 MBPS, when the link is protected by a 
static key. However, the average throughput for the same link was 28.4 MBPS when 
the link was protected by the proposed security protocol. The results confirm that the 
protocol does not cause any significant overhead on the performance of the wireless 
link, since the throughput in a link on average decreased by only 7%.  
 
 Fig. 6. The simulated network topology in Qualnet Simulator 
 
The impact of the security protocol for key generation and revocation on packet 
drop rate in real-time applications is also studied in the simulation. For this purpose, a 
VoIP application is invoked between two MRs which generated UDP traffic in the 
wireless link.  The packet drop rates in wireless link when the link is protected with 
the proposed security protocol and when the link is protected with a static key. The 
transmission rate was set to 1 MBPS. The average packet drop rate in 10 simulation 
runs was found to be only 4%.  The results clearly demonstrate that the proposed 
security scheme has no adverse impact on packet drop rate even if several key switch-
ing (regeneration and revocation) operations are carried out.  
The performance of the privacy protocol is also analyzed in terms of its storage, 
communication overhead. Both storage and communication overhead were found to 
increase linearly with the number of nodes in the network. In fact, it has been analyti-
cally shown that overhead due to cryptographic operation on each message is: 60n + 
60 bytes, where n represents the number of public key pairs used to generate the ring 
signature [20]. It is clear that the privacy protocol has a low overhead.   
7   Conclusion and Future Work 
WMNs have become an important focus area of research in recent years owing to their 
great promise in realizing numerous next-generation wireless services. Driven by the 
demand for rich and high-speed content access, recent research has focused on devel-
oping high performance communication protocols, while security and privacy issues 
have received relatively little attention. However, given the wireless and multi-hop 
nature of communication, WMNs are subject to a wide range of security and privacy 
threats. This paper has presented a security and user-privacy preserving protocol for 
WMNs. The proposed security protocol ensures security in both the access and the 
backbone networks, whereas the privacy protocol enables anonymous authentication 
of the users. Simulation results have shown the effectiveness of the protocol. Future 
research issues include the study of a distributed and collaborative system where the 
authentication service is provided by a dynamically selected set of MRs. The integra-
tion with the current centralized scheme would increase the robustness of the proposed 
protocol, maintaining a low overhead since MRs would use the distributed service 
only when the central server is not available.         
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